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Thinking Machines: Some Fundamental Confusions

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Abstract

This paper explores Church's Thesis and related claims madeby Turing. Church's Thesis concerns computable numerical functions, whileTuring's claims concern both procedures for manipulating uninterpreted marksand machines that generate the results that these procedures would yield. Itis argued that Turing's claims are true, and that they support (the truth of)Church's Thesis. It is further argued that the truth of Turing's and Church'sTheses has no interesting consequences for human cognition or cognitiveabilities. The Theses don't even mean that computers can do as much as peoplecan when it comes to carrying out effective procedures. For carrying out aprocedure is a purposive, intentional activity. No actual machine does, orcan do, as much.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Philosophy and Center for Cognitive Science, State University of New York at Buffalo, Buffalo, N.Y, 14260, U.S.A.

    John T. Kearns

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  1. John T. Kearns
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Kearns, J.T. Thinking Machines: Some Fundamental Confusions. Minds and Machines 7, 269–287 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008202117814

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008202117814

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