Abstract
The postulate of Recovery, among the six postulates for theory contraction, formulated and studied by Alchourrón, Gärdenfors and Makinson is the one that has provoked most controversy. In this article we construct withdrawal functions that do not satisfy Recovery, but try to preserve minimal change, and relate these withdrawal functions with the AGM contraction functions.
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Fermé, E.L. On the Logic of Theory Change: Contraction without Recovery. Journal of Logic, Language and Information 7, 127–137 (1998). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008241816078
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008241816078