Abstract
In this paper we present a causal theory based on aninterventionist conception of causality, i.e., a preference toselect causes among a set of actions which an agent has the abilityto perform or not to perform (free will). The most interestingproposals encountered in the literature, in nonmonotonic reasoning,all revolve around the ordered notion of similarity, abnormality,preference etc... but do not provide a full-fledgedsolution to the problem of the concrete definition of this order. Inour approach we relate the notion of action to norms (what isnormally the case when an action is undertaken, what is normally theoutcome of that action) and considering reasonable assumptions, weshow the existence and uniqueness of the set of voluntary causes foran observed effect (explanation problem). Moreover, the approach advocated in this paper handles ramifications correctly.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Explore related subjects
Discover the latest articles, news and stories from top researchers in related subjects.References
“AI. Special issue on non-monotonic logics,” Artificial Intelligence, vol. 13,nos. 1–2, April 1980.
J. Allen, “Towards a general theory of action and time,” Artificial Intelligence, vol. 23, pp. 123–154, 1984.
A.B. Baker, “A simple solution to the yale shooting problem,” in KR, pp. 11–20, 1989.
A.B. Baker and M.L. Ginsberg, “Temporal projection and explanation,” in International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1989.
A.B. Baker and Y. Shoham, “Nonmonotonic temporal reasoning,” in The Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programing, edited by D. Gabbay, 1989.
J.P. Delgrande, “A first-order conditional logic for prototypical properties,” Artificial Intelligence, vol. 33, pp. 105–130, 1987.
S. Hanks and D.V. McDermott, “Nonmonotonic logic and temporal projection,” Artificial Intelligence, vol. 33, pp. 379–412, 1987.
B.A. Haugh, “Simple causal minimizations for temporal persistence and projection,” in AAAI, pp. 218–223, 1987.
P.J. Hayes and J. McCarthy, “Some philosophical problems in artificial intelligence,” Machine Intelligence, edited by B. Meltzer and D. Michie, vol. 4., Edinburgh University Press, 1969.
H.A. Kautz, “The logic of persistence,” in AAAI, pp. 401–405, 1986.
S.A. Kripe, “Semantical consideration on modal logic,” Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 16, pp. 83–94, 1963.
V. Lifchitz, “Pointwise circumscription: Preliminary report,” in AAAI, pp. 406–410, 1986.
J.L. Mackey, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation, Oxford University Press, 1974.
D.V. McDermott, “A temporal logic for reasoning about process and plans,” Cognitive Science, vol. 6, pp. 101–155, 1982.
D.V. McDermott, “A critique of pure reason,” Computational Intelligence, vol. 3, pp. 151–160, 1987.
A. Mokhtari, Apport des Logiques Non Classiques pour une Représentation de la Causalité. Thèse de Doctorat d'Université, LIPN Université Paris XIII, 1994.
A. Mokhtari, Norme et action pour une représentation de la causalité. Congrés RFIA, pp. 553–562, 1994.
L. Morgenstern and L.A. Stein, “Why things go wrong: a formal theory of causal reasoning,” in AAAI, 1988.
E. Sandewall, “Filter preferential entailment for the logic of action in almost continuous worlds,” in International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 1989.
E. Sandewall, “The range of applicability of nonmonotonic logics for the inertia problem,” in IJCAI, pp. 738–743, 1993.
Y. Shoham, Reasoning About Change: Time and Causation from the Standpoint of Artificial Intelligence, MIT Press, 1988.
Y. Shoham, “Time for action: on the relation between time, knowledge and action,” in IJCAI, pp. 954–1173, 1989.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Mokhtari, A. Action-Based Causal Reasoning. Applied Intelligence 7, 99–111 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008261710574
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008261710574