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Subsidy Competition in Networks

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Abstract

This paper investigates a competitive location model on a network with free entry and exit. The given network consists of regions that represent independent jurisdictions. Market entry and exit are sequential. In each stage of the multi-stage game, the regions simultaneously decide what subsidy to offer to a firm should it located within its boundaries. The paper delineates three distinct classes of subsidy policies and examines their effects in a series of computational tests.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. University of New Brunswick, Fredericton, NB, Canada

    H.A. Eiselt

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  1. H.A. Eiselt
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Eiselt, H. Subsidy Competition in Networks. Computational & Mathematical Organization Theory 6, 99–111 (2000). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009629410788

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009629410788