Abstract
The past few decades have seen a resurgence ofreasoning techniques in artificial intelligenceinvolving both classical and non-classical logics. Inhis paper, ``Multi-valued Logics: A Uniform Approach toReasoning in Artificial Intelligence'', Ginsberg hasshown that through the use of bilattices,several reasoning techniques can be unified under asingle framework. A bilattice is a structure that canbe viewed as a class of truth values that canaccommodate incomplete and inconsistent informationand in certain cases default information. Inbilattice theory, knowledge is ordered along twodimensions: truth/falsity and certainty/uncertainty. By defining the corresponding bilattices as truthspaces, Ginsberg has shown that the same theoremprover can be used to simulate reasoning in firstorder logic, default logic, prioritized default logicand assumption truth maintenance system. Although thisis a significant contribution, Ginsberg's paper waslengthy and involved. This paper summarizes some ofthe essential concepts and foundations of bilatticetheory. Furthermore, it discusses the connections ofbilattice theory and several other existingmulti-valued logics such as the various three-valuedlogics and Belnap's four-valued logic. It is notedthat the set of four truth values in Belnap's logicform a lattice structure that is isomorphic to thesimplest bilattice. Subsequently, Fitting proposed aconflation operation that can be used to selectsub-sets of truth values from this and otherbilattices. This method of selecting sub-sets oftruth values provides a means for identifyingsub-logic in a bilattice.
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Sim, K.M. Bilattices and Reasoning in Artificial Intelligence: Concepts and Foundations. Artificial Intelligence Review 15, 219–240 (2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011049617655
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1011049617655