Abstract
In this paper we study how to distribute the cost caused by the delay of a project among the firms which are responsible for it. We present two rules, one based on serial cost sharing problems and the other, in game theory. Moreover, we introduce some desirable properties, inspired by well-known principles, and study which of them are satisfied by the rules.
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Bergantiños, G., Sánchez, E. How to Distribute Costs Associated with a Delayed Project. Annals of Operations Research 109, 159–174 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016300218643
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016300218643