Abstract
Semivalues are shown to exhibit a capability of modification that enables us to introduce additional information in the evaluation of games. After using a general method to design modified versions of the Shapley and Banzhaf values, we apply them to some political, economic and sociological problems.
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Carreras, F., Freixas, J. Semivalue Versatility and Applications. Annals of Operations Research 109, 343–358 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016320723186
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016320723186