Abstract
The complexity of a computational problem is the order of computational resources which are necessary and sufficient to solve the problem. The algorithm complexity is the cost of a particular algorithm. We say that a problem has polynomial complexity if its computational complexity is a polynomial in the measure of input size. We introduce polynomial time algorithms based in generating functions for computing the Myerson value in weighted voting games restricted by a tree. Moreover, we apply the new generating algorithm for computing the Myerson value in the Council of Ministers of the European Union restricted by a communication structure.
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Fernández, J., Algaba, E., Bilbao, J. et al. Generating Functions for Computing the Myerson Value. Annals of Operations Research 109, 143–158 (2002). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016348001805
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1016348001805