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Beliefs, time and incomplete information in multiple encounter negotiations among autonomous agents

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Abstract

In negotiations among autonomous agents over resource allocation, beliefs about opponents, and about opponents’ beliefs, become particularly important when there is incomplete information. This paper considers interactions among self‐motivated, rational, and autonomous agents, each with its own utility function, and each seeking to maximize its expected utility. The paper expands upon previous work and focuses on incomplete information and multiple encounters among the agents. It presents a strategic model that takes into consideration the passage of time during the negotiation and also includes belief systems. The paper provides strategies for a wide range of situations. The framework satisfies the following criteria: symmetrical distribution, simplicity, instantaneously, efficiency and stability.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Mathematics and Computer Science, Bar Ilan University, 52900, Ramat Gan, Israel

    Sarit Kraus

  2. Institute for Advanced Computer Studies, University of Maryland, College Park, 20742, MD, USA

    Sarit Kraus

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  1. Sarit Kraus
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Kraus, S. Beliefs, time and incomplete information in multiple encounter negotiations among autonomous agents. Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 20, 111–159 (1997). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1018928310720

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