Abstract
I respond to Erik Olsson's critique of my account of contraction frominconsistent belief states, by admitting that such contraction cannot be rationalized as adeliberate decision problem. It can, however, be rationalized as a routine designed prior toinadvertent expansion into inconsistency when the deliberating agent embraces a consistent point of view.
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Levi, I. Contracting From Epistemic Hell is Routine. Synthese 135, 141–164 (2003). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022915525935
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1022915525935