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Security of Signature Schemes in a Multi-User Setting

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Abstract

This paper initiates the study of the security of signature schemes in the multi-user setting. We argue that the well-accepted notion of security for signature schemes, namely existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attacks, is not adequate for the multi-user setting. We propose an extension of this security notion to the multi-user setting and show that signature schemes proven secure in the single-user setting can, under reasonable constraints, also be proven secure in the multi-user setting.

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Authors
  1. Alfred Menezes
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  2. Nigel Smart
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Menezes, A., Smart, N. Security of Signature Schemes in a Multi-User Setting. Designs, Codes and Cryptography 33, 261–274 (2004). https://doi.org/10.1023/B:DESI.0000036250.18062.3f

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/B:DESI.0000036250.18062.3f

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