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Stability of coalitions in a heterogeneous population

  • Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
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Abstract

This paper considers a certain model of coalition formation by players with different preferences characterized by ideal points. The coalition policy is defined as the median of the ideal points distribution for its members. The agent’s payoff depends on the size and policy of the coalition it joins. A new feature of the model lies in that the set of players is also heterogeneous with respect to a parameter of the payoff function: by assumption, some quantity of new-type agents (“conformists”) evaluating differently the distance between their ideal points and the coalition policy is added to the main type of agents (“individualists”). Both types are randomly distributed on the set of ideal points. We study the existence and properties of Nash and coalitional equilibria in the model.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia

    A. A. Vasin, Yu. V. Sosina & D. S. Stepanov

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  1. A. A. Vasin
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  2. Yu. V. Sosina
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  3. D. S. Stepanov
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Correspondence to A. A. Vasin.

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Original Russian Text © A.A. Vasin, Yu.V. Sosina, D.S. Stepanov, 2011, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Prilozheniya, 2011, No. 1, pp. 3–23.

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Vasin, A.A., Sosina, Y.V. & Stepanov, D.S. Stability of coalitions in a heterogeneous population. Autom Remote Control 76, 1123–1135 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915060168

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915060168

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