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Conditions for sustainable cooperation

  • Mathematical Game Theory and Applications
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Abstract

There are three important aspects to-be-taken into account when the stability problem of a long-term cooperative agreement is investigated: time consistency (dynamic stability) of the cooperative agreement, strategic stability and irrational behavior proofness. The mathematical results based on imputation distribution procedure (IDP) are developed for dealing with the above-mentioned aspects of cooperation. The authors prove that, for a special class of differential games, a time-consistent cooperative agreement can be strategically supported by a Nash equilibrium. An example is also considered, where all the three conditions are satisfied.

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References

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Saint Petersburg State University, St. Petersburg, Russia

    L. A. Petrosjan & N. A. Zenkevich

Authors
  1. L. A. Petrosjan
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  2. N. A. Zenkevich
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Correspondence to L. A. Petrosjan.

Additional information

Original Russian Text © L.A. Petrosjan, N.A. Zenkevich, 2009, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Priloszheniya, 2009, No. 1, pp. 106–123.

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Petrosjan, L.A., Zenkevich, N.A. Conditions for sustainable cooperation. Autom Remote Control 76, 1894–1904 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915100148

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915100148

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