Abstract
This paper considers particular classes of differential hierarchical two-player games in open-loop strategies. The games are interpreted as models of corruption and sustainable management in hierarchical systems. We formulate optimality principles for the above classes of games as modifications of Stackelberg equilibria. And finally, equilibrium design algorithms for the games are suggested and tested using a series of numerical examples.
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Original Russian Text © G.A. Ougolnitsky, A.B. Usov, 2013, published in Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya, 2013, No. 2, pp. 82–104.
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Ougolnitsky, G.A., Usov, A.B. Dynamic hierarchical two-player games in open-loop strategies and their applications. Autom Remote Control 76, 2056–2069 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915110144
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117915110144