Abstract
Side-channel attacks enable powerful adversarial strategies against cryptographic devices and encounter an ever-growing attack surface in today’s world of digitalization and the internet of things. While the employment of provably secure side-channel countermeasures like masking have become increasingly popular in recent years, great care must be taken when implementing these in actual devices. The reasons for this are two-fold: The models on which these countermeasures rely do not fully capture the physical reality and compliance with the requirements of the countermeasures is non-trivial in complex implementations. Therefore, it is imperative to validate the SCA-security of concrete instantiations of cryptographic devices using measurements on the actual device. In this article we propose a side-channel evaluation framework that combines an efficient data acquisition process with state-of-the-art confidence interval based leakage assessment. Our approach allows a sound assessment of the potential susceptibility of cryptographic implementations to side-channel attacks and is robust against noise in the evaluation system. We illustrate the steps in the evaluation process by applying them to a protected implementation of AES.
About the authors
Florian Bache studied IT-Security at the Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany (Dipl.-Ing. in 2015). After two years at Prof. Güneysu’s group for Computer Engineering and IT-Security (CEITS) at the University of Bremen, Germany he continued his research in hardware security with focus on side-channel attacks and countermeasures at the group for Security Engineering (SecEng) led by Prof. Güneysu in Bochum.
Christina Plump is a researcher at University of Bremen, Germany with the research group computer architecture (AGRA). She has studied mathematics and computer science as well as economics. Her research interests include cryptographic security and its formal representation, for which she uses her strong theoretical background in (mathematical) cryptology, description logics and complexity theory as well as statistics. Other research interests of hers are multi objective optimization, which she works on in the CRC (Collaborative Research Center) ‘Farbige Zustände’ funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG).
Jonas Wloka is a junior researcher in the Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) division of the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI) in Bremen and currently finishing his Master’s degree in computer science at the University of Bremen, Germany. Among his research interests are the security of cryptographic systems – on algorithmic, protocol and (hardware) implementation level – and building high-performance cryptanalytic systems.
Tim Güneysu is professor and head of the chair for Security Engineering at Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany. Since 2016 he is also affiliated with the Cyber Physical Systems (CPS) division of the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI) in Bremen. Prior to this position, he was a senior researcher with UMass Amherst, assistant professor in Ruhr-Universität Bochum and visiting professor in the Hubert Curien Lab in Saint-Etienne. Tim’s primary research topics are in the field of secure system engineering with focus on long-term secure cryptographic implementations, the design of security architectures for embedded systems and related aspects of hardware security. In the area of applied security and cryptography, Tim published and contributed to more than 100 peer-reviewed journal and conference publications.
Rolf Drechsler received the Diploma and Dr. phil. nat. degrees in computer science from the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt am Main, Frankfurt am Main, Germany, in 1992 and 1995, respectively. Since October 2001, Rolf Drechsler is Full Professor and Head of the Group of Computer Architecture, Institute of Computer Science, at the University of Bremen, Germany. In 2011, he additionally became the Director of the Cyber-Physical Systems Group at the German Research Center for Artificial Intelligence (DFKI) in Bremen. His current research interests include the development and design of data structures and algorithms with a focus on circuit and system design. He is an IEEE Fellow.
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