Abstract
Current blockchain consensus protocols have a triangle of contradictions in aspects of decentralization, security, and energy consumption, and cannot be synchronously optimized. We describe a design of two new blockchain consensus protocols, called “CHB-consensus” and “CHBD-consensus,” based on a consistent hash algorithm. Honest miners can fairly gain the opportunity to create blocks. They do not consume any extra computational power resources when creating new blocks, and such blocks can obtain the whole blockchain network to confirm consensus with fairness. However, malicious miners have to pay massive computational power resources for attacking the new block creation privilege or double-spending. Blockchain networks formed by CHB-consensus and CHBD-consensus are based on the same security assumption as that in Bitcoin systems, so they save a huge amount of power without sacrificing decentralization or security. We analyze possible attacks and give a rigorous but adjustable validation strategy. CHB-consensus and CHBD-consensus introduce a certification authority (CA) system, which does not have special management or control rights over blockchain networks or data structures, but carries the risk of privacy breaches depending on credibility and reliability of the CA system. Here, we analyze the robustness and energy consumption of CHB-consensus and CHBD-consensus, and demonstrate their advantages through theoretical derivation.
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Lei YU, Xiao-fang ZHAO, Yan JIN, Heng-yi CAI, Bo WEI, and Bin HU declare that they have no conflict of interest.
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Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 61672499, 61772502, and 61972382), the Key Special Project of Beijing Municipal Science & Technology Commission, China (No. Z181100003218018), the Natural Science Foundation of Inner Mongolia, Open Foundation of State Key Laboratory of Networking and Switching Technology of China (No. SKLNST-2016- 2-09), the SV-ICT Blockchain & DAPP Joint Lab of China, and the ICT-SSC Blockchain Joint Lab of China
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Yu, L., Zhao, Xf., Jin, Y. et al. Low powered blockchain consensus protocols based on consistent hash. Frontiers Inf Technol Electronic Eng 20, 1361–1377 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1631/FITEE.1800119
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1631/FITEE.1800119