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A strategy-proof auction mechanism for service composition based on user preferences

考虑用户偏好的服务组合防策略拍卖机制

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Abstract

Service composition is an effective method of combining existing atomic services into a value-added service based on cost and quality of service (QoS). To meet the diverse needs of users and to offer pricing services based on QoS, we propose a service composition auction mechanism based on user preferences, which is strategy-proof and can be beneficial in selecting services based on user preferences and dynamically determining the price of services. We have proven that the proposed auction mechanism achieves desirable properties including truthfulness and individual rationality. Furthermore, we propose an auction algorithm to implement the auction mechanism, and carry out extensive experiments based on real data. The results verify that the proposed auction mechanism not only achieves desirable properties, but also helps users find a satisfactory service composition scheme.

摘要

服务组合是一种基于服务成本和服务质量 (QoS) 将现有原子服务组合为增值服务的有效方法. 为满足用户的多样化需求, 提供基于QoS的定价服务, 提出一种基于用户偏好的服务组合拍卖机制, 该机制具有防策略性, 有利于根据用户偏好选择服务, 动态确定服务价格. 本文证明, 所提出的拍卖机制达到了期望的性质, 包括真实性和个体合理性. 此外, 提出一种拍卖算法来实现拍卖机制, 并在真实数据基础上进行大量实验. 结果表明, 所提出的拍卖机制不仅达到预期效果, 而且帮助用户找到满意的服务组合方案.

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Authors

Contributions

Yao XIA and Zhiqiu HUANG designed the research. Yao XIA processed the data and drafted the manuscript. Zhiqiu HUANG helped organize the manuscript. Yao XIA revised and finalized the paper.

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Zhiqiu Huang  (黄志球).

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Yao XIA and Zhiqiu HUANG declare that they have no conflict of interest.

Additional information

Project supported by the Collaborative Innovation Center of Novel Software Technology and Industrialization, the National Key Research and Development Program of China (Nos. 2016YFB1000802 and 2018YFB1003900), and the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 61772270)

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Xia, Y., Huang, Z. A strategy-proof auction mechanism for service composition based on user preferences. Front Inform Technol Electron Eng 22, 185–201 (2021). https://doi.org/10.1631/FITEE.1900726

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1631/FITEE.1900726

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