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  • From War to Genocide: Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990–1994 by André Guichaoua
  • Jennie E. Burnet
André Guichaoua. From War to Genocide: Criminal Politics in Rwanda, 1990–1994. Translated by Don E. Webster. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2015. lx– 416 pp. Notes. References. Index. US $79.95 (hardcover), ISBN: 9780299298203. US $26.95 (paper), ISBN: 9780299298241.

From War to Genocide is the most detailed and nuanced history of the 1994 genocide of Tutsis published to date. Originally published in French under the title Rwanda, de la guerre au génocide les politiques criminelles au Rwanda (1990–1994), the book has been abridged by the author and translated by Don Webster. The book eschews simplistic explanations of the 1994 genocide either as ancient, “tribal” hatred, or as a carefully orchestrated genocide plan whose foundations were laid decades ahead. Instead, the author, French sociologist André Guichaoua, carefully considers the growing body of empirical evidence that demonstrates that the genocide followed different trajectories in communities across the country and that the genocide of Tutsis as a coherent national policy emerged in the first five days after the shooting down of president Juvénal Habyarimana’s plane. Anyone with an interest in Rwanda, the African Great Lakes region, or genocide and mass atrocities should read this book. As a scholar who has focused on Rwanda and the genocide for twenty years, I learned something new on nearly every page.

A sociologist of development studies, Guichaoua conducted research in Rwanda throughout the 1980s and early 1990s. In fact, he happened to be in the capital, Kigali, during the first few days of the genocide until he was evacuated (p. 144). He then became a leading expert witness before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the years following the genocide. He worked closely with the ICTR prosecutor’s office and had exceptional access to documents and evidence amassed by the court. In preparing the book, Guichaoua also relied on his own network of Rwandan informants who lived inside and outside the country and whom he interviewed over the years. The author’s long-term experience in and knowledge of the country allow him to interpret the subtle power dynamics that led to the genocide, [End Page 119] which include affinities based on regionalism, kin, soccer clubs, and church congregations as much as ethnicity. His trove of evidence remains archived on a website for others to access.

In this ground-breaking book, André Guichaoua squares off against the history of the 1994 genocide of Tutsis disseminated by the current Rwandan government, led by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), and against counter-narratives to this history disseminated by former leaders of the Rwandan government and exiled opponents of the RPF government. As a social scientist and empiricist Guichaoua rejects the canonical story endorsed by the RPF, which argues that the genocide began as an ideological project dating back to the revolution of 1959 that was “periodically revived” through genocidal practices and the development of a genocidal ideology culminating in the planning and implementation of the events of 1994 (p. 231). Instead, Guichaoua shows the ways in which the assassination of President Habyarimana simultaneously set in motion political machinations among an inner circle of Hutu elite who had created a parallel power structure to the government and spontaneous, but organized, massacres led by the Interahamwe militias. While Guichaoua rejects the RPF’s history of a long-standing genocidal plan, he also clearly opposes the notion that the “events of 1994” and massacres of civilians were not genocide as many former political and military leaders and some Hutus insist. Instead, Guichaoua embraces a theory that fits empirical fact: the genocide of Tutsis did not begin as a fait accompli. It emerged to become national policy over several days as Hutu extremist politicians, military officers, and businessmen jockeyed for position and took over the government. This conclusion is particularly important to social scientists who study genocide and mass atrocities and policymakers who want to intervene to circumvent or stop it.

Another of the author’s ground-breaking conclusions is that the RPF was responsible for shooting down President Habyarimana’s plane. The polarizing question of...

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