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Approaches to protection of applications based on the TLS protocol against attacks using revoked certificates

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Abstract

This article considers problems with security of applications based on the TLS protocol. Scenarios, when these applications fall under attacks using revoked certificates, are described. The current methods of checking the status of X.509 public key infrastructure certificates used together with the TLS protocol are compared, and their strong and weak points are specified.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Peter the Great St. Petersburg Polytechnic University, St. Petersburg, 195251, Russia

    A. G. Busygin, A. S. Konoplev & M. O. Kalinin

Authors
  1. A. G. Busygin
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  2. A. S. Konoplev
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  3. M. O. Kalinin
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to A. G. Busygin.

Additional information

Original Russian Text © A.G. Busygin, A.S. Konoplev, M.O. Kalinin, 2016, published in Problemy Informatsionnoi Bezopasnosti, Komp’yuternye Sistemy.

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Busygin, A.G., Konoplev, A.S. & Kalinin, M.O. Approaches to protection of applications based on the TLS protocol against attacks using revoked certificates. Aut. Control Comp. Sci. 50, 743–748 (2016). https://doi.org/10.3103/S0146411616080290

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.3103/S0146411616080290

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