Emerging Techniques for Field Device Security
- Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Bechtel Corp. (United States)
- Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States)
Critical infrastructure, such as electrical power plants and oil refineries, rely on embedded devices to control essential processes. State of the art security is unable to detect attacks on these devices at the hardware or firmware level. We provide an overview of the hardware used in industrial control system field devices, look at how these devices have been attacked, and discuss techniques and new technologies that may be used to secure them. We follow three themes: (1) Inspectability, the capability for an external arbiter to monitor the internal state of a device. (2) Trustworthiness, the degree to which a system will continue to function correctly despite disruption, error, or attack. (3) Diversity, the use of adaptive systems and complexity to make attacks more difficult by reducing the feasible attack surface.
- Research Organization:
- Sandia National Lab. (SNL-NM), Albuquerque, NM (United States); Sandia National Lab. (SNL-CA), Livermore, CA (United States)
- Sponsoring Organization:
- USDOE Office of Cybersecurity, Energy Security, and Emergency Response (CESER), Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration (ISER)
- Grant/Contract Number:
- AC04-94AL85000
- OSTI ID:
- 1183104
- Report Number(s):
- SAND-2014-17095J; 537058
- Journal Information:
- IEEE Security & Privacy, Vol. 12, Issue 6; ISSN 1540-7993
- Publisher:
- IEEECopyright Statement
- Country of Publication:
- United States
- Language:
- English
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