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ICE: an iterative combinatorial exchange

Published: 05 June 2005 Publication History

Abstract

We present the first design for a fully expressive iterative combinatorial exchange (ICE). The exchange incorporates a tree-based bidding language that is concise and expressive for CEs. Bidders specify lower and upper bounds on their value for different trades. These bounds allow price discovery and useful preference elicitation in early rounds, and allow termination with an efficient trade despite partial information on bidder valuations. All computation in the exchange is carefully optimized to exploit the structure of the bid-trees and to avoid enumerating trades. A proxied interpretation of a revealed-preference activity rule ensures progress across rounds. A VCG-based payment scheme that has been shown to mitigate opportunities for bargaining and strategic behavior is used to determine final payments. The exchange is fully implemented and in a validation phase.

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cover image ACM Conferences
EC '05: Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
June 2005
302 pages
ISBN:1595930493
DOI:10.1145/1064009
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 05 June 2005

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Author Tags

  1. VCG
  2. combinatorial exchange
  3. preference elicitation
  4. threshold payments

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EC05
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EC05: Sixth ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce 2005
June 5 - 8, 2005
BC, Vancouver, Canada

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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The 25th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation
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  • (2021)Efficient Peer-to-Peer Energy Trading Mechanisms with Unreliable ProsumersProceedings of the Twelfth ACM International Conference on Future Energy Systems10.1145/3447555.3464854(49-59)Online publication date: 22-Jun-2021
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