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A comparison of bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions

Authors:

Teddy Candale,

Sandip SenAuthors Info & Claims

ACM SIGecom Exchanges, Volume 5, Issue 5

Pages 41 - 48

https://doi.org/10.1145/1124566.1124572

Published: 01 January 2006 Publication History

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Abstract

Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raise challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary bundle. In the real world all or most of the items of interest to an agent is not present in a single combinatorial auction. We focus on bidding for multiple items in a set of auctions, each of which sell only a single unit of a particular item. Hence an agent has to bid in multiple auctions to obtain item bundles. While an optimal bidding strategy is known when bidding in sequential auctions, only suboptimal strategies are available when bidding for items sold in auctions running simultaneously. We investigate a hill-climbing bidding strategy, which is optimal given an infinite number of restarts, to decide on an agent's bid for simultaneous auctions. We provide a comparison of this algorithm with existing ones, both in terms of utilities generated and computation time, along with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these strategies.

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Kumar PRani KTripathi S(2021)E-BIDDER (Bidding is now on your fingers)International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science, Engineering and Information Technology10.32628/CSEIT2172118(617-624)Online publication date: 25-Apr-2021
https://doi.org/10.32628/CSEIT2172118
Mukherjee AKwon H(2010)General auction-theoretic strategies for distributed partner selection in cooperative wireless networksIEEE Transactions on Communications10.1109/TCOMM.2010.082010.08024858:10(2903-2915)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TCOMM.2010.082010.080248
Candale TSen S(2007)Multi-dimensional bid improvement algorithm for simultaneous auctionsProceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence10.5555/1625275.1625472(1215-1220)Online publication date: 6-Jan-2007
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1625275.1625472

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A comparison of bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions

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Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary bundle. In the real world all or most of the items of interest to an agent ...

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Published In

ACM SIGecom Exchanges Volume 5, Issue 5

January 2006

48 pages

EISSN:1551-9031

DOI:10.1145/1124566

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

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Published: 01 January 2006

Published in SIGECOM Volume 5, Issue 5

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Kumar PRani KTripathi S(2021)E-BIDDER (Bidding is now on your fingers)International Journal of Scientific Research in Computer Science, Engineering and Information Technology10.32628/CSEIT2172118(617-624)Online publication date: 25-Apr-2021
https://doi.org/10.32628/CSEIT2172118
Mukherjee AKwon H(2010)General auction-theoretic strategies for distributed partner selection in cooperative wireless networksIEEE Transactions on Communications10.1109/TCOMM.2010.082010.08024858:10(2903-2915)Online publication date: 1-Oct-2010
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/TCOMM.2010.082010.080248
Candale TSen S(2007)Multi-dimensional bid improvement algorithm for simultaneous auctionsProceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence10.5555/1625275.1625472(1215-1220)Online publication date: 6-Jan-2007
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1625275.1625472

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A Pooling Analysis of Two Simultaneous Online Auctions

The Impact of Discrete Bidding and Bidder Aggressiveness on Sellers' Strategies in Open English Auctions: Reserves and Covert Shilling

Evaluating bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions

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