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New trade-offs in cost-sharing mechanisms

Published: 21 May 2006 Publication History

Abstract

A cost-sharing mechanism is a protocol that collects bids from a set of players, selects a subset of the players to receive a service (incurring a subset-dependent cost), and determines a price to charge each of these players. Three standard requirements for cost-sharing mechanisms are incentive compatibility, which states that players are motivated to bid their true valuation for the service; budget-balance, meaning that the prices charged should recover the cost incurred; and efficiency, which states that the cost incurred and the valuations of the players served should be traded off in an optimal way. These three goals have been known to be mutually incompatible for thirty years. As a result, nearly all work on cost-sharing mechanisms in the economics and theoretical computer science literatures has focused on achieving two of these goals while completely ignoring the third.We show that incentive-compatibility, budget-balance, and approximate efficiency are simultaneously achievable for a wide range of cost functions, where efficiency is measured using the social cost---the sum of the incurred service cost and the excluded valuations. In particular, we prove such guarantees for well-known mechanisms for all submodular cost functions and for the Steiner tree cost function. We also prove a generic, quantifiable trade-off between the objectives of efficiency and budget-balance in groupstrategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms.

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    STOC '06: Proceedings of the thirty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing
    May 2006
    786 pages
    ISBN:1595931341
    DOI:10.1145/1132516
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    Published: 21 May 2006

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    Author Tags

    1. Braess's Paradox
    2. random graphs
    3. selfish routing

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    May 21 - 23, 2006
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