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Bid expressiveness and clearing algorithms in multiattribute double auctions

Published: 11 June 2006 Publication History

Abstract

We investigate the space of two-sided multiattribute auctions, focusing on the relationship between constraints on the offers traders can express through bids, and the resulting computational problem of determining an optimal set of trades. We develop a formal semantic framework for characterizing expressible offers, and show conditions under which the allocation problem can be separated into first identifying optimal pairwise trades and subsequently optimizing combinations of those trades. We analyze the bilateral matching problem while taking into consideration relevant results from multiattribute utility theory. Network flow models we develop for computing global allocations facilitate classification of the problem space by computational complexity, and provide guidance for developing solution algorithms. Experimental trials help distinguish tractable problem classes for proposed solution techniques.

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      cover image ACM Conferences
      EC '06: Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
      June 2006
      342 pages
      ISBN:1595932364
      DOI:10.1145/1134707
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      Published: 11 June 2006

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      1. auctions
      2. multiattribute auctions

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      June 11 - 15, 2006
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      • (2016)Truthful multi-unit multi-attribute double auctions for perishable supply chain tradingTransportation Research Part E: Logistics and Transportation Review10.1016/j.tre.2016.05.00993(21-37)Online publication date: Sep-2016
      • (2016)Hesitant Fuzzy Multiattribute Matching Decision Making Based on Regret Theory with Uncertain WeightsInternational Journal of Fuzzy Systems10.1007/s40815-016-0213-x19:4(955-966)Online publication date: 5-Jul-2016
      • (2015)A Multi-objective Matching Approach for One-Shot Multi-attribute Exchanges Under a Fuzzy EnvironmentInternational Journal of Fuzzy Systems10.1007/s40815-015-0001-z17:1(53-66)Online publication date: 1-Mar-2015
      • (2015)Iterative Auction Based Bandwidth Assignment in CRNs with QoS ProvisioningWireless Personal Communications: An International Journal10.1007/s11277-014-2108-180:4(1703-1715)Online publication date: 1-Feb-2015
      • (2014)Multi-Round Auction for Bandwidth Assignment in Relay TransmissionIEEE Wireless Communications Letters10.1109/LWC.2014.23174753:4(361-364)Online publication date: Aug-2014
      • (2011)Auctions and biddingACM Computing Surveys10.1145/1883612.188361743:2(1-59)Online publication date: 4-Feb-2011
      • (2011)Multi-objective optimization matching for one-shot multi-attribute exchanges with quantity discounts in E-brokerageExpert Systems with Applications: An International Journal10.1016/j.eswa.2010.09.07938:4(4169-4180)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2011
      • (2011)Coordination and Pricing in Service Value Networks: A Mechanism Design ApproachBusiness Aspects of Web Services10.1007/978-3-642-22447-8_7(129-170)Online publication date: 12-Sep-2011
      • (2010)A multidimensional procurement auction for trading composite servicesElectronic Commerce Research and Applications10.1016/j.elerap.2009.11.0019:5(460-472)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2010
      • (2010)A graphical formalism for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctionsAutonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems10.1007/s10458-009-9085-x20:3(342-368)Online publication date: 1-May-2010
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