Article

Multi-attribute coalitional games

Authors:

Yoav ShohamAuthors Info & Claims

EC '06: Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

Pages 170 - 179

https://doi.org/10.1145/1134707.1134726

Published: 11 June 2006 Publication History

Abstract

We study coalitional games where the value of cooperation among the agents are solely determined by the attributes the agents possess, with no assumption as to how these attributes jointly determine this value. This framework allows us to model diverse economic interactions by picking the right attributes. We study the computational complexity of two coalitional solution concepts for these games -- the Shapley value and the core. We show how the positive results obtained in this paper imply comparable results for other games studied in the literature.

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Cited By

Hu FBi SZhu Y(2024)Cooperative Game-Based Digital Twin Drives Decision Making: Overall Framework, Basic Formalization and Application CaseMathematics10.3390/math1202035512:2(355)Online publication date: 22-Jan-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/math12020355
D'Angelo GDelfaraz EGilbert HPelachaud CTaylor MFaliszewski PMascardi V(2022)Computation and Bribery of Voting Power in Delegative Simple GamesProceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3535850.3535889(336-344)Online publication date: 9-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3535850.3535889
Greco GLupia FScarcello F(2019)Coalitional Games Induced by Matching Problems: Complexity and Islands of Tractability for the Shapley ValueArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2019.103180(103180)Online publication date: Oct-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2019.103180
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Multi-attribute coalitional games

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

EC '06: Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference on Electronic commerce

June 2006

342 pages

ISBN:1595932364

DOI:10.1145/1134707

General Chair:
Joan Feigenbaum
Yale University, USA
,
Program Chairs:
John Chuang
University of California Berkeley, USA
,
David M. Pennock
Yahoo! Research, USA

Copyright © 2006 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 11 June 2006

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EC06

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EC06: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce

June 11 - 15, 2006

Michigan, Ann Arbor, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

Hu FBi SZhu Y(2024)Cooperative Game-Based Digital Twin Drives Decision Making: Overall Framework, Basic Formalization and Application CaseMathematics10.3390/math1202035512:2(355)Online publication date: 22-Jan-2024
https://doi.org/10.3390/math12020355
D'Angelo GDelfaraz EGilbert HPelachaud CTaylor MFaliszewski PMascardi V(2022)Computation and Bribery of Voting Power in Delegative Simple GamesProceedings of the 21st International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems10.5555/3535850.3535889(336-344)Online publication date: 9-May-2022
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3535850.3535889
Greco GLupia FScarcello F(2019)Coalitional Games Induced by Matching Problems: Complexity and Islands of Tractability for the Shapley ValueArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2019.103180(103180)Online publication date: Oct-2019
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2019.103180
Hatano DYoshida Y(2018)Computational aspects of the preference cores of supermodular two-scenario cooperative gamesProceedings of the 27th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/3304415.3304460(310-316)Online publication date: 13-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3304415.3304460
Colini-Baldeschi RScarsini MVaccari S(2017)Variance Allocation and Shapley ValueMethodology and Computing in Applied Probability10.1007/s11009-016-9540-520:3(919-933)Online publication date: 7-Jan-2017
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11009-016-9540-5
Skibski OMatejczyk SMichalak TWooldridge MYokoo MJonker CMarsella SThangarajah JTuyls K(2016)k-Coalitional Cooperative GamesProceedings of the 2016 International Conference on Autonomous Agents & Multiagent Systems10.5555/2936924.2936953(177-185)Online publication date: 9-May-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/2936924.2936953
Greco GMalizia EPalopoli LScarcello F(2015)The Complexity of the Nucleolus in Compact GamesACM Transactions on Computation Theory10.1145/2692372.26923747:1(1-52)Online publication date: 13-Jan-2015
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2692372.2692374
Bhagat SKim AMuthukrishnan SWeinsberg U(2014)The Shapley Value in Knapsack Budgeted GamesWeb and Internet Economics10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_8(106-119)Online publication date: 2014
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_8
Kenari SJahan MJalali M(2011)Multi-skill agents coalition formation under skill uncertainty2011 International Symposium on Artificial Intelligence and Signal Processing (AISP)10.1109/AISP.2011.5960992(89-96)Online publication date: Jun-2011
https://doi.org/10.1109/AISP.2011.5960992
Greco GMalizia EPalopoli LScarcello F(2011)On the complexity of core, kernel, and bargaining setArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2011.06.002175:12-13(1877-1910)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1016/j.artint.2011.06.002
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