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A novel method for automatic strategy acquisition in N-player non-zero-sum games

Published: 08 May 2006 Publication History

Abstract

We present a novel method for automatically acquiring strategies for the double auction by combining evolutionary optimization together with a principled game-theoretic analysis. Previous studies in this domain have used standard co-evolutionary algorithms, often with the goal of searching for the "best" trading strategy. However, we argue that such algorithms are often ineffective for this type of game because they fail to embody an appropriate game-theoretic solution-concept, and it is unclear, what, if anything, they are optimizing. In this paper, we adopt a more appropriate criterion for success from evolutionary game-theory based on the likely adoption-rate of a given strategy in a large population of traders, and accordingly we are able to demonstrate that our evolved strategy performs well.

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cover image ACM Conferences
AAMAS '06: Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
May 2006
1631 pages
ISBN:1595933034
DOI:10.1145/1160633
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 08 May 2006

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Author Tags

  1. adaptation and learning
  2. auctions and electronic markets
  3. game theoretic foundations of agent systems
  4. multi-agent evolution

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Cited By

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  • (2020)Economic Reasoning from Simulation-Based Game ModelsLe raisonnement économique dans les modèles de jeux basés sur des simulationsOEconomia10.4000/oeconomia.8386(257-278)Online publication date: 1-Jun-2020
  • (2017)A Genetic Algorithmic Approach to Automated Auction Mechanism DesignAgent-Mediated Electronic Commerce. Designing Trading Strategies and Mechanisms for Electronic Markets10.1007/978-3-319-54229-4_9(127-142)Online publication date: 24-Feb-2017
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