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Computationally efficient and revenue optimized auctioneer's strategy for expanding auctions

Published: 08 May 2006 Publication History

Abstract

An expanding auction---a special type of an ascending-price open-cry auction---allows the auctioneer to dynamically add (identical) items to the single item offered initially. Expanding auctions are becoming an increasingly popular business-to-consumer auction mechanism. The auctioneer's revenue from an expanding auction depends, in large part, on its schedule for increasing the number of units offered. As we show, the naïve strategies commonly used for increasing the number of items offered in contemporary e-commerce implementations of expanding auctions are sub-optimal. In this study we provide a strategy that, given some assumptions about buyers' behaviors, maximizes the expected revenues of the auctioneer in an expanding auction. We model the auction process as a state graph in which nodes are auction states and edges are transitions. With this model, finding the optimal strategy is equivalent to solving a search problem on the state graph. We prove that the search problem to be solved, although seemingly exponentially complex, is actually linearly bounded. Based on this result, we introduce an informed decision strategy that optimizes the auctioneer's revenue.

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  • (2013)How Much Should You Pay for Information?Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE 10th International Conference on e-Business Engineering10.1109/ICEBE.2013.7(44-49)Online publication date: 11-Sep-2013
  • (2008)Theoretically Founded Optimization of Auctioneer’s Revenues in Expanding AuctionsAgent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis10.1007/978-3-540-88713-3_5(62-75)Online publication date: 2008

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    cover image ACM Conferences
    AAMAS '06: Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
    May 2006
    1631 pages
    ISBN:1595933034
    DOI:10.1145/1160633
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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    Published: 08 May 2006

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    1. auctioneer's revenue
    2. expanding auction

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    View all
    • (2013)How Much Should You Pay for Information?Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE 10th International Conference on e-Business Engineering10.1109/ICEBE.2013.7(44-49)Online publication date: 11-Sep-2013
    • (2008)Theoretically Founded Optimization of Auctioneer’s Revenues in Expanding AuctionsAgent-Mediated Electronic Commerce and Trading Agent Design and Analysis10.1007/978-3-540-88713-3_5(62-75)Online publication date: 2008

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