Evaluating bidding strategies for simultaneous auctions
Authors: 
Teddy Candale, Sandip SenAuthors Info & Claims
Teddy Candale, Sandip SenAuthors Info & ClaimsPages 1211 - 1213
Abstract
Bidding for multiple items or bundles on online auctions raises challenging problems. We assume that an agent has a valuation function that returns its valuation for an arbitrary bundle. In the real world all or most of the items of interest to an agent is not present in a single combinatorial auction. We study the problem of bidding for multiple items in a set of simultaneous auctions, each of which sell only a single unit of a particular item. Hence an agent has to bid in multiple auctions to obtain preferred item bundles. While an optimal bidding strategy is known when bidding in sequential auctions, only suboptimal strategies are available when bidding for items sold in auctions running simultaneously. To decide on an agent's bid for simultaneous auctions, we investigate a multi-dimensional bid improvement strategy, which is optimal given an infinite number of restarts. We provide a comparison of this algorithm with existing ones, both in terms of utilities generated and computation time, along with a discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of these strategies.
References
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T. Candale. Hill-climbing approach to bidding for bundles in simultaneous auctions. Master's thesis, University of Tulsa, August 2005.
[2]
A. Greenwald and J. Boyan. Bidding under uncertainty: theory and experiments. In AUAI '04: Proceedings of the 20th conference on Uncertainty in artificial intelligence, pages 209--216. AUAI Press, 2004.
[3]
A. Greenwald and J. Boyan. Bidding algorithms for simultaneous auctions: A case study. Journal of Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 10(1):67--89, 2005.
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A. Greenwald and P. Stone. Autonomous bidding agents in the trading agent competition. IEEE Internet Computing, 5(2):52--60, 2001.
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T. Sandholm. emediator: a next generation electronic commerce server. In AGENTS '00: Proceedings of the fourth international conference on Autonomous agents, pages 341--348. ACM Press, 2000.
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S. Sen, T. Candale, and S. Basak. Profit sharing auction. In Proceedings of the Twentieth International Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-2005), July 2005.
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P. Stone and A. Greenwald. The first international trading agent competition: Autonomous bidding agents. Journal of Electronic Commerce Research, 2003.
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P. Stone, R. E. Schapire, M. L. Littman, J. A. Csirik, and D. McAllester. Decision-theoretic bidding based on learned density models in simultaneous, interacting auctions. Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 19:209--242, 2003.
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Information & Contributors
Information
Published In
May 2006
1631 pages
ISBN:1595933034
DOI:10.1145/1160633
- General Chairs:
- Hideyuki Nakashima,
- Michael Wellman,
- Program Chairs:
- Gerhard Weiss,
- Peter Stone
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- SIGAI: ACM Special Interest Group on Artificial Intelligence
- ATAL: The International Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages
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Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
Publication History
Published: 08 May 2006
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- SIGAI
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AAMAS06: AAMAS '06 - 5th International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-agent Systems 2006
May 8 - 12, 2006
Japan, Hakodate
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