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Modelling the relative strength of security protocols

Published: 30 October 2006 Publication History

Abstract

In this paper, we present a way to think about the relative strength of security protocols using SoS, a lattice-theoretic representation of security strength. In particular, we discuss how the model can be used, present the TLS protocol as a compelling real world example, show how it is modeled, and then explain how lattice-theoretic properties can be used to evaluate security protocols.

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  • (2008)Identity protection factor (IPF)Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Identity and trust on the Internet10.1145/1373290.1373293(8-18)Online publication date: 4-Mar-2008

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cover image ACM Conferences
QoP '06: Proceedings of the 2nd ACM workshop on Quality of protection
October 2006
70 pages
ISBN:1595935533
DOI:10.1145/1179494
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 30 October 2006

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Author Tags

  1. comparison
  2. cryptographic protocols
  3. lattice
  4. relative strength

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  • (2008)Identity protection factor (IPF)Proceedings of the 7th symposium on Identity and trust on the Internet10.1145/1373290.1373293(8-18)Online publication date: 4-Mar-2008

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