Article

Secure information flow with random assignment and encryption

Authors:

Geoffrey Smith,

Rafael AlpízarAuthors Info & Claims

FMSE '06: Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security

Pages 33 - 44

https://doi.org/10.1145/1180337.1180341

Published: 03 November 2006 Publication History

Abstract

Type systems for secure information flow aim to prevent a program from leaking information from variables classified as $H$ to variables classified as $L$. In this work we extend such a type system to address encryption and decryption; our intuition is that encrypting a $H$ plaintext yields a $L$ ciphertext. We argue that well-typed, polynomial-time programs in our system satisfy a computational probabilistic noninterference property, provided that the encryption scheme is IND-CCA secure. As a part of our proof, we first consider secure information flow in a language with a random assignment operator (but no encryption). We establish a result that may be of independent interest, namely, that well-typed, probabilistically total programs with random assignments satisfy probabilistic noninterference. We establish this result using a weak probabilistic bisimulation.

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Cited By

Linvill KKaki GWustrow E(2023)Verifying Indistinguishability of Privacy-Preserving ProtocolsProceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages10.1145/36228497:OOPSLA2(1442-1469)Online publication date: 16-Oct-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3622849
Kozyri ESchneider F(2020)RIFJournal of Computer Security10.3233/JCS-19131628:2(191-228)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.3233/JCS-191316
Darais DSweet ILiu CHicks M(2019)A language for probabilistically oblivious computationProceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages10.1145/33711184:POPL(1-31)Online publication date: 20-Dec-2019
https://doi.org/10.1145/3371118
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Index Terms

Secure information flow with random assignment and encryption
1. Software and its engineering
  1. Software notations and tools
    1. General programming languages
      1. Language features
2. Theory of computation
  1. Logic
    1. Programming logic
  2. Semantics and reasoning
    1. Program reasoning

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Information & Contributors

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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences

FMSE '06: Proceedings of the fourth ACM workshop on Formal methods in security

November 2006

84 pages

ISBN:1595935509

DOI:10.1145/1180337

General Chair:
Marianne Winslett
UIUC
,
Program Chairs:
Andrew D. Gordon
Microsoft Research, UK
,
David Sands
Chalmers University of Technology, Sweden

Copyright © 2006 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 03 November 2006

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CCS06

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CCS06: 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2006

November 3, 2006

Virginia, Alexandria, USA

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Cited By

Linvill KKaki GWustrow E(2023)Verifying Indistinguishability of Privacy-Preserving ProtocolsProceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages10.1145/36228497:OOPSLA2(1442-1469)Online publication date: 16-Oct-2023
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3622849
Kozyri ESchneider F(2020)RIFJournal of Computer Security10.3233/JCS-19131628:2(191-228)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2020
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.3233/JCS-191316
Darais DSweet ILiu CHicks M(2019)A language for probabilistically oblivious computationProceedings of the ACM on Programming Languages10.1145/33711184:POPL(1-31)Online publication date: 20-Dec-2019
https://doi.org/10.1145/3371118
Waye LBuiras PArden ORusso AChong SThuraisingham BEvans DMalkin TXu D(2017)Cryptographically Secure Information Flow Control on Key-Value StoresProceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security10.1145/3133956.3134036(1893-1907)Online publication date: 30-Oct-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/3133956.3134036
Blanchet B(2012)Automatically Verified Mechanized Proof of One-Encryption Key ExchangeProceedings of the 2012 IEEE 25th Computer Security Foundations Symposium10.1109/CSF.2012.8(325-339)Online publication date: 25-Jun-2012
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1109/CSF.2012.8
Blanchet B(2012)Security protocol verificationProceedings of the First international conference on Principles of Security and Trust10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_2(3-29)Online publication date: 24-Mar-2012
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-642-28641-4_2
Fournet CPlanul JRezk TChen YDanezis GShmatikov V(2011)Information-flow types for homomorphic encryptionsProceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security10.1145/2046707.2046747(351-360)Online publication date: 17-Oct-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2046707.2046747
Vaughan JWeirich SDreyer D(2011)AuraConfProceedings of the 7th ACM SIGPLAN workshop on Types in language design and implementation10.1145/1929553.1929563(45-58)Online publication date: 25-Jan-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/1929553.1929563
Cortier VKremer SWarinschi B(2011)A Survey of Symbolic Methods in Computational Analysis of Cryptographic SystemsJournal of Automated Reasoning10.1007/s10817-010-9187-946:3-4(225-259)Online publication date: 1-Apr-2011
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10817-010-9187-9
Laud PTšahhirov I(2009)A user interface for a game-based protocol verification toolProceedings of the 6th international conference on Formal Aspects in Security and Trust10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_19(263-278)Online publication date: 5-Nov-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-642-12459-4_19
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