Abstract
The semantic gap between specification and implementation languages for sensor networks security protocols impedes the specification and verification of the protocols. In this work, we present SLEDE, an event-based specification language and its verifying compiler that address this semantic gap. We demonstrate the features of SLEDE through an example specification of the μTesla, secure broadcast protocol for sensor networks.
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