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Yootopia!

Published: 01 January 2007 Publication History

Abstract

The nascent Yootopia Project at Yahoo! Research brings together three related research agendas: mechanisms for group decision making, prediction, and payment infrastructure. The currency (scrip system) is called Yootles and underlies (but is orthogonal to) the group decision and prediction mechanisms. We present an array of currency-agnostic decision mechanisms for small groups, describing new and existing mechanisms for (1) choosing among a short list of options, (2) choosing among an effectively innumerable list of options, as in meeting scheduling, (3) allocating shared goods and responsibilities, (4) public good provision, and (5) bilateral trade. We list desirable mechanism properties and describe the tradeoffs that the mechanisms make among them. Finally, we describe a small step towards synthesis of group decisions and group prediction: an interface for friendly wagers.

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Published In

cover image ACM SIGecom Exchanges
ACM SIGecom Exchanges  Volume 6, Issue 2
January 2007
57 pages
EISSN:1551-9031
DOI:10.1145/1228621
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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 01 January 2007
Published in SIGECOM Volume 6, Issue 2

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Author Tags

  1. mechanism design
  2. scrip systems

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