Matthias Schwan
ABSTRACT
The overall security level of applications running on a smart card is not only determined by the particular applications and by the operating system but also by external devices. All proposed security models of smart card operating systems assume the secure communication of applications on the card and the outside world, e.g. card readers, to be implemented by the applications themselves. In order to integrate external devices and external applications in a mandatory security policy, we extend the SMaCOS security model, which combines the secrecy model by Bell/LaPadula and the integrity model by Biba. Therefore, we introduce a modified execution access right and use integrity access categories to implement real world applications. As a case study, we give a signature creation application in combination with biometric user verification.
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Index Terms
- An extended model of security policy for multi-applicative smart cards
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