Article

Sequential voting rules and multiple elections paradoxes

Authors:

Mingsheng YingAuthors Info & Claims

TARK '07: Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge

Pages 279 - 288

https://doi.org/10.1145/1324249.1324286

Published: 25 June 2007 Publication History

Abstract

Multiple election paradoxes arise when voting separately on each issue from a set of related issues results in an obviously undesirable outcome. Several authors have argued that a sufficient condition for avoiding multiple election paradoxes is the assumption that voters have separable preferences. We show that this extremely demanding restriction can be relaxed into the much more reasonable one: there exists a linear order x₁ > … > x_p on the set of issues such that for each voter, every issue x_i is preferentially independent of x_i+1, …, x_p given x₁, …, x_i-1. This leads us to define a family of sequential voting rules, defined as the sequential composition of local voting rules. These rules relate to the setting of conditional preference networks (CP-nets) recently developed in the Artificial Intelligence literature. We study in detail how these sequential rules inherit, or do not inherit, the properties of their local components. We focus on the case of multiple referenda, corresponding to multiple elections with binary issues.

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Cited By

Lukasiewicz TMalizia E(2021)Complexity Results for Preference Aggregation over (m)CP-nets: Max and Rank VotingArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2021.103636(103636)Online publication date: Nov-2021
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103636
Ali AHamilton HRayner EYang BZilles S(2021)Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference NetworksAlgorithmic Decision Theory10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_1(3-18)Online publication date: 27-Oct-2021
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_1
Babichenko YDean OTennenholtz M(2019)Sequential Voting with Confirmation NetworkElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science10.4204/EPTCS.297.2297(19-34)Online publication date: 19-Jul-2019
https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.297.2
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cover image ACM Other conferences

TARK '07: Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge

June 2007

296 pages

ISBN:9781450378413

DOI:10.1145/1324249

Program Chair:
Dov Samet

Copyright © 2007 ACM.

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 25 June 2007

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TARK '07 Paper Acceptance Rate 32 of 100 submissions, 32%;

Overall Acceptance Rate 61 of 177 submissions, 34%

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Cited By

Lukasiewicz TMalizia E(2021)Complexity Results for Preference Aggregation over (m)CP-nets: Max and Rank VotingArtificial Intelligence10.1016/j.artint.2021.103636(103636)Online publication date: Nov-2021
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.artint.2021.103636
Ali AHamilton HRayner EYang BZilles S(2021)Aggregating Preferences Represented by Conditional Preference NetworksAlgorithmic Decision Theory10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_1(3-18)Online publication date: 27-Oct-2021
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-87756-9_1
Babichenko YDean OTennenholtz M(2019)Sequential Voting with Confirmation NetworkElectronic Proceedings in Theoretical Computer Science10.4204/EPTCS.297.2297(19-34)Online publication date: 19-Jul-2019
https://doi.org/10.4204/EPTCS.297.2
Malizia EAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)More Complexity Results about Reasoning over ( m )CP-netsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237930(1540-1548)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3237383.3237930
Conitzer V(2018)Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and votingAnnals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence10.1007/s10472-010-9205-y58:3-4(239-259)Online publication date: 28-Dec-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10472-010-9205-y
Dorn BKrüger D(2016)On the hardness of bribery variants in voting with CP-netsAnnals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence10.1007/s10472-015-9469-377:3-4(251-279)Online publication date: 1-Aug-2016
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/s10472-015-9469-3
Meir R(2016)Strong and Weak Acyclicity in Iterative VotingAlgorithmic Game Theory10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_15(182-194)Online publication date: 1-Sep-2016
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53354-3_15
Rossi FVenable KWalsh T(2011)A Short Introduction to Preferences: Between Artificial Intelligence and Social ChoiceSynthesis Lectures on Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning10.2200/S00372ED1V01Y201107AIM0145:4(1-102)Online publication date: 25-Jul-2011
https://doi.org/10.2200/S00372ED1V01Y201107AIM014
Xia LLang J(2009)A dichotomy theorem on the existence of efficient or neutral sequential voting correspondencesProceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/1661445.1661500(342-347)Online publication date: 11-Jul-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1661445.1661500
Conitzer VLang JXia L(2009)How hard is it to control sequential elections via the agenda?Proceedings of the 21st International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence10.5555/1661445.1661463(103-108)Online publication date: 11-Jul-2009
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/1661445.1661463
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