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Strategic delay in bargaining

Published: 14 May 2007 Publication History

Abstract

We study strategic delay in bargaining under uncertainty. First, we discuss bargaining situations in which dynamics and uncertainty may induce the use of strategic delay by intelligent agents. Then, we analyze strategic delay under various circumstances. Finally, we propose an agent reasoning mechanism to decide when and how to deploy strategic delay.

References

[1]
Cho, I. Uncertainty and delay in bargaining. Review of Economic Studies, 57 (1990), 575--596.
[2]
Dekel, E. Simultaneous offers and the inefficiency of bargaining: A two period example. Journal of Economic Theory, 50 (1990), 300--308.
[3]
Faratin, P., Sierra, C. and Jennings, N. R. Negotiation decision functions for autonomous agents. Int. Journal of Robotics and Autonomous Systems, 24, 3--4 (1998), 159--182.
[4]
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica, 47 (1979), 263--291.
[5]
Larson, K. and Sandholm, T. An alternating offers bargaining model for computationally-limited agents. In Proc. AAMAS 2002, Bologna, Italy, 2002, 135--142.
[6]
Roth, A. E., Murnighan, J. K. and Schoumaker, F. The deadline effect in bargaining: Some experimental evidence. American Economic Review, 78, 4 (1988), 806--823.
[7]
Sim, K. M. and Wang, S. Y. Flexible Negotiation agent with relaxed decision rules. IEEE Trans. on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part B, 34, 3 (2004), 1602--1608.
[8]
Winoto, P. McCalla, G. I. and Vassileva, J. Non-monotonic-offers bargaining protocol. Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 11, 1 (2005), 45--67.

Cited By

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  • (2023)Decision Times Reveal Private Information in Strategic Settings: Evidence from Bargaining ExperimentsThe Economic Journal10.1093/ej/uead055133:656(3007-3033)Online publication date: 24-Jul-2023
  • (undefined)On the Strategic Use of Response TimesSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3023640

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cover image ACM Other conferences
AAMAS '07: Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
May 2007
1585 pages
ISBN:9788190426275
DOI:10.1145/1329125
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Association for Computing Machinery

New York, NY, United States

Publication History

Published: 14 May 2007

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Author Tags

  1. bargaining
  2. multiagent systems
  3. strategic delay

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Cited By

View all
  • (2023)Decision Times Reveal Private Information in Strategic Settings: Evidence from Bargaining ExperimentsThe Economic Journal10.1093/ej/uead055133:656(3007-3033)Online publication date: 24-Jul-2023
  • (undefined)On the Strategic Use of Response TimesSSRN Electronic Journal10.2139/ssrn.3023640

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