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Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values

Authors:

Florin Constantin,

Takayuki Ito,

David C. ParkesAuthors Info & Claims

AAMAS '07: Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems

Article No.: 110, Pages 1 - 3

https://doi.org/10.1145/1329125.1329260

Published: 14 May 2007 Publication History

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Abstract

Interdependent values (IDV) is a valuation model allowing bidders in an auction to express their value for the item(s) to sell as a function of the other bidders' information. We investigate the incentive compatibility (IC) of single-item auctions for IDV bidders in dynamic environments. We provide a necessary and sufficient characterization for IC in this setting. We show that if bidders can misreport departure times and private signals, no reasonable auction can be IC. We present a reasonable IC auction for the case where bidders cannot misreport departures.

References

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M. Aoyagi, "Optimal Sales Schemes Against Interdependent Buyers", October 2005. www.iser.osaka-u.ac.jp/library/dp/2005/DP0645.pdf

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P. Dasgupta and E. Maskin, "Efficient Auctions", The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. CXV, May 2000.

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M. Hajiaghayi, R. Kleinberg and D. Parkes, "Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions", ACM EC 2004.

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[4]

M. Hajiaghayi, R. Kleinberg and D. Parkes, "Online Auctions with Re-usable Goods", ACM EC 2005.

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V.Krishna, "Auction Theory", Academic Press, 2002.

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T. Ito and D. Parkes, "Instantiating the Contingent Bids Model of Truthful Interdependent Value Auctions", Proceedings of AAMAS 2006.

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A. Juda and D. Parkes, "The Sequential Auction Problem on eBay: An Empirical Analysis and a Solution", Proceedings of ACM EC 2006.

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D. Parkes, "Online Mechanisms", in "Algorithmic Game Theory", edited by N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos and V. Vazirani, Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007

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F. Constantin, T. Ito and D. Parkes, "Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values" (full version), www.eecs.harvard.edu/~florin/pubs/oabivfull.pdf

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Cited By

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Gkatzelis VPatel RPountourakis ESchoepflin D(2021)Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent ValuesAlgorithmic Game Theory10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_5(64-78)Online publication date: 14-Sep-2021
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_5
Gerstgrasser MAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)On the Complexity of Optimal Correlated Auctions and Reverse AuctionsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237474(605-613)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3237383.3237474
Ripamonti LTrubian MMaggiorini DPreviti S(2017)Video Games and Operations ResearchComputers in Entertainment 10.1145/276713616:1(1-12)Online publication date: 23-Dec-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2767136
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Index Terms

Online auctions for bidders with interdependent values
1. Applied computing
  1. Law, social and behavioral sciences

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Published In

AAMAS '07: Proceedings of the 6th international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems

May 2007

1585 pages

ISBN:9788190426275

DOI:10.1145/1329125

Conference Chairs:
Edmund Durfee
University of Michigan
,
Makoto Yokoo
Kyushu University
,
Program Chairs:
Michael Huhns
University of South Carolina
,
Onn Shehory
IBM Haifa Research Lab, Israel

Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 14 May 2007

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AAMAS07: International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Mulitagent Systems

May 14 - 18, 2007

Hawaii, Honolulu

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Gkatzelis VPatel RPountourakis ESchoepflin D(2021)Prior-Free Clock Auctions for Bidders with Interdependent ValuesAlgorithmic Game Theory10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_5(64-78)Online publication date: 14-Sep-2021
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-85947-3_5
Gerstgrasser MAndre EKoenig SDastani MSukthankar G(2018)On the Complexity of Optimal Correlated Auctions and Reverse AuctionsProceedings of the 17th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems10.5555/3237383.3237474(605-613)Online publication date: 9-Jul-2018
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.5555/3237383.3237474
Ripamonti LTrubian MMaggiorini DPreviti S(2017)Video Games and Operations ResearchComputers in Entertainment 10.1145/276713616:1(1-12)Online publication date: 23-Dec-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2767136
Kellomäki T(2017)Fast Water Simulation Methods for GamesComputers in Entertainment10.1145/270053316:1(1-14)Online publication date: 23-Dec-2017
https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2700533
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Caragiannis IKaklamanis CKyropoulou M(2016)Limitations of Deterministic Auction Design for Correlated BiddersACM Transactions on Computation Theory10.1145/29343098:4(1-18)Online publication date: 29-Jun-2016
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A robust combinatorial auction mechanism against shill bidders

A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions

A dynamic axiomatic approach to first-price auctions

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