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Peer-assisted content distribution with prices

Published: 09 December 2008 Publication History

Abstract

Peer-assisted content distribution matches user demand for content with available supply at other peers in the network. Inspired by this supply-and-demand interpretation of the nature of content sharing, we employ price theory to study peer-assisted content distribution. The market-clearing prices are those which align supply and demand, and the system is studied through the characterization of price equilibria. We discuss the efficiency and robustness gains of price-based multilateral exchange, and show that simply maintaining a single price per peer (even across multiple files) suffices to achieve these benefits.
Our main contribution is a system design---PACE (Price-Assisted Content Exchange)---that effectively and practically realizes multilateral exchange. Its centerpiece is a market-based mechanism for exchanging currency for desired content, with a single, decentralized price per peer. Honest users are completely shielded from any notion of prices, budgeting, allocation, or other market issues, yet strategic or malicious clients cannot unduly damage the system's efficient operation. Our design encourages sharing of desirable content and network-friendly resource utilization.
Bilateral barter-based systems such as BitTorrent have been attractive in large part because of their simplicity. Our research takes a significant step in understanding the efficiency and robustness gains possible with multilateral exchange.

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cover image ACM Conferences
CoNEXT '08: Proceedings of the 2008 ACM CoNEXT Conference
December 2008
526 pages
ISBN:9781605582108
DOI:10.1145/1544012
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 09 December 2008

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