Soumya Paul
ABSTRACT
We study games in which the choices available to players are not fixed, and may change during the course of play. Specifically, we consider a model in which players may switch strategies, and a global (social) decision may remove some choices, based on the strategies being adopted by players. We propose a logical formalism in which such choices are specified, and a model of bounded memory strategies in which the eventual implications of such choices can be computed, and present preliminary results.
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Index Terms
- Dynamic restriction of choices: a preliminary logical report
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