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Optimal collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification

Published: 06 July 2009 Publication History

Abstract

We present the first general positive result on the construction of collusion-resistant mechanisms, that is, mechanisms that guarantee dominant strategies even when agents can form arbitrary coalitions and exchange compensations (sometimes referred to as transferable utilities or side payments). This is a much stronger solution concept as compared to truthful or even group-strategyproof mechanisms, and only impossibility results were known for this type of mechanisms in the "classical" model.
We describe collusion-resistant mechanisms with verification that return optimal solutions for a wide class of mechanism design problems (which includes utilitarian ones as a special case). Note that every collusion-resistant mechanism without verification has an unbounded approximation factor and, in general, optimal solutions cannot be obtained even if we content ourselves with truthful ("non-collusion-resistant") mechanisms. All these results apply to problems that have been extensively studied in the algorithmic mechanism design literature such as task scheduling and inter-domain routing.

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Cited By

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  • (2023)Collusion-Resistant Worker Recruitment in Crowdsourcing SystemsIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2021.307109322:1(129-144)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2023
  • (2019)Partial verification as a substitute for moneyProceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirty-First Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and Ninth AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011837(1837-1844)Online publication date: 27-Jan-2019
  • (2014)Combinatorial auctions without moneyProceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems10.5555/2615731.2617410(1029-1036)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
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Published In

cover image ACM Conferences
EC '09: Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
July 2009
376 pages
ISBN:9781605584584
DOI:10.1145/1566374
  • General Chair:
  • John Chuang,
  • Program Chairs:
  • Lance Fortnow,
  • Pearl Pu
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Publication History

Published: 06 July 2009

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Author Tags

  1. algorithmic mechanism design
  2. collusion
  3. transferable utilities

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  • Research-article

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EC '09
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EC '09: ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
July 6 - 10, 2009
California, Stanford, USA

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Overall Acceptance Rate 664 of 2,389 submissions, 28%

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Cited By

View all
  • (2023)Collusion-Resistant Worker Recruitment in Crowdsourcing SystemsIEEE Transactions on Mobile Computing10.1109/TMC.2021.307109322:1(129-144)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2023
  • (2019)Partial verification as a substitute for moneyProceedings of the Thirty-Third AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Thirty-First Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence Conference and Ninth AAAI Symposium on Educational Advances in Artificial Intelligence10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33011837(1837-1844)Online publication date: 27-Jan-2019
  • (2014)Combinatorial auctions without moneyProceedings of the 2014 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems10.5555/2615731.2617410(1029-1036)Online publication date: 5-May-2014
  • (2013)Truthful Many-to-Many Assignment with Private WeightsAlgorithms and Complexity10.1007/978-3-642-38233-8_18(209-220)Online publication date: 2013
  • (2012)Mechanism designProceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce10.1145/2229012.2229035(266-283)Online publication date: 4-Jun-2012
  • (2012)Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal SolutionsACM Transactions on Computation Theory (TOCT)10.1145/2189778.21897814:2(1-17)Online publication date: 1-May-2012
  • (2010)Combinatorial auctions with verification are tractableProceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II10.5555/1882123.1882129(39-50)Online publication date: 6-Sep-2010
  • (2010)Combinatorial Auctions with Verification Are TractableAlgorithms – ESA 201010.1007/978-3-642-15781-3_4(39-50)Online publication date: 2010
  • (2008)Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms with Verification Yielding Optimal SolutionsAlgorithms - ESA 200810.1007/978-3-540-87744-8_59(708-719)Online publication date: 2008

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