Abstract
We briefly summarize our recent work characterizing the efficiency of equilibria in pricing games in two-sided combinatorial markets.
- BAGNOLI, M. AND BERGSTROM, T. 2005. Log-concave probability and its applications. Economic Theory 26, 2 (08), 445-469.Google Scholar
- BAYE, M. R. AND MORGAN, J. 1999. A folk theorem for one-shot bertrand games. Economics Letters 65, 1, 59-65.Google ScholarCross Ref
- CHAWLA, S. AND NIU, F. 2009. The Price of Anarchy in Bertrand Games. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce. To appear. Google ScholarDigital Library
- CHAWLA, S. AND ROUGHGARDEN, T. 2008. Bertrand competition in networks. In Symposium on Algorithmic Game Theory. 70-82. Google ScholarDigital Library
- HARRINGTON, J. J. 1989. A re-evaluation of perfect competition as the solution to the bertrand price game. Mathematical Social Sciences 17, 3, 315-328.Google ScholarCross Ref
- MAS-COLELL, A., WHINSTON, M. D., AND GREEN, J. R. 1995. Microeconomic Theory. Oxford.Google Scholar
- OZDAGLAR, A. AND SRIKANT, R. 2007. Incentives and pricing in communication networks. In Algorithmic Game Theory. Cambridge Press.Google Scholar
- Wikipedia. Bertrand paradox. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bertrand_paradox_(economics).Google Scholar
Index Terms
- Bertrand competition in networks
Recommendations
The price of anarchy in bertrand games
EC '09: Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerceThe Internet is composed of multiple economically-independent service providers that sell bandwidth in their networks so as to maximize their own revenue. Users, on the other hand, route their traffic selfishly to maximize their own utility. How does ...
Bertrand equilibria and efficiency in markets for congestible network services
This paper is motivated by study of the economics of Quality of Service (QoS) of congestible services. We introduce a queueing game framework to study such problems. We consider multiple competing providers, each offering a queued service. Users are ...
Eliciting Coordination with Rebates
This article considers a mechanism based on rebates that aims at reducing congestion in urban networks. The framework helps select rebate levels so that enough commuters switch to modes that are under used. Indeed, getting a relative small number of ...
Comments