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A new fault cryptanalysis on montgomery ladder exponentiation algorithm

Published:24 November 2009Publication History

ABSTRACT

The Montgomery ladder exponentiation algorithm is recognized as a very efficient countermeasure against Simple Power Analysis and C Safe-Error Attacks on RSA or elliptic curve cryptosystem. In this paper, we demonstrate the vulnerability of the Montgomery ladder algorithm to fault analysis attack when an error is injected during its operation in an embedded cryptographic chip. After injecting an error, we measure the power traced and compare it with an original correct trace. As a result, we can derive the secret key of the public-key cryptosystems such as RSA by computing the correlation coefficients of two power traces for correct and faulty cryptographic operations with same input.

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          cover image ACM Other conferences
          ICIS '09: Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Interaction Sciences: Information Technology, Culture and Human
          November 2009
          1479 pages
          ISBN:9781605587103
          DOI:10.1145/1655925

          Copyright © 2009 ACM

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          Association for Computing Machinery

          New York, NY, United States

          Publication History

          • Published: 24 November 2009

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