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Algorithmic game theory

Published:01 July 2010Publication History
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Abstract

A new era of theoretical computer science addresses fundamental problems about auctions, networks, and human behavior.

References

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              cover image Communications of the ACM
              Communications of the ACM  Volume 53, Issue 7
              July 2010
              133 pages
              ISSN:0001-0782
              EISSN:1557-7317
              DOI:10.1145/1785414
              Issue’s Table of Contents

              Copyright © 2010 ACM

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              Publication History

              • Published: 1 July 2010

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