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Fair cost allocation mechanisms in electronic waste collection and recycling networks

Published: 14 May 2010 Publication History

Abstract

The collection and recycling of electronic waste (e-waste) has become one of the key issues in environmental protection, and many state-operated programs have been launched to mandate the recycling of e-waste state-wide in the US. The costs incurred under the state-run operations are allocated to manufacturers according to collective Extended Producer Responsibility (EPR) legislation which is widely adopted in e-waste programs. In this paper, we study the problem of allocating cost among manufacturers in a fair manner, which is essential for maintaining an efficient and stable state-operated program. We introduce a new cooperative game model where sub-coalitions can access external resources that are not owned by their members at predesigned unit prices. It is indicated in (Kalai and Zemel 1982) that the existence of external resources accessible to sub-coalitions may lead to an empty core of the resulting game and thus undermines the stability of a collaborative system. Our result shows that by proper pricing mechanisms of the external resources that are centrally controlled, such potential negative impacts on the coalition stability can be eliminated and a fair cost allocation is guaranteed to exist.

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  • (2014)Robust design of a closed-loop supply chain network for uncertain carbon regulations and random product flowsEURO Journal on Transportation and Logistics10.1007/s13676-014-0043-73:1(5-34)Online publication date: 11-Feb-2014

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    BQGT '10: Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions
    May 2010
    155 pages
    ISBN:9781605589190
    DOI:10.1145/1807406
    Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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    • Eller College of Management

    In-Cooperation

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    New York, NY, United States

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    Published: 14 May 2010

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    • (2014)Robust design of a closed-loop supply chain network for uncertain carbon regulations and random product flowsEURO Journal on Transportation and Logistics10.1007/s13676-014-0043-73:1(5-34)Online publication date: 11-Feb-2014

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