Rationalizability, adaptive dynamics, and the correspondence principle in games with strategic substitutes
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- Rationalizability, adaptive dynamics, and the correspondence principle in games with strategic substitutes
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- Eller College of Management
In-Cooperation
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Association for Computing Machinery
New York, NY, United States
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