Amanda Friedenberg
ABSTRACT
A fundamental solution concept in game theory is the iterative deletion of strongly dominated strategies. The concept has a long history in game theory, going back at least to Luce and Raiffa (1957). Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) asserted that (up to issues of correlation) the iteratively undominated (IU) strategies correspond to the strategies consistent with common knowledge of rationality. Since then, many papers have formally investigated the epistemic conditions of IU. (See, e.g., Brandenburger and Dekel (1987), Tan and Werlang (1988), Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002), among many others.) In this paper we revisit the epistemic conditions for IU. We point out that, in somewhat subtle ways, the literature is incomplete. We go on to provide novel epistemic conditions for IU.
- Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi. 2002. "Strong belief and forward induction reasoning." Journal of Economic Theory 106(2):356--391.Google Scholar
Cross Ref
- Bernheim, B. D. 1984. "Rationalizable strategic behavior." Econometrica 52(4):1007--1028.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel. 1987. "Rationalizability and correlated equilibria." Econometrica 55(6):1391--1402.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Luce, R. D. and H. Raiffa. 1957. Games and decisions. Wiley New York.Google Scholar
- Pearce, D. G. 1984. "Rationalizable strategic behavior and the problem of perfection." Econometrica 52(4):1029--1050.Google ScholarCross Ref
- Tan, T. C. C. and SRC Werlang. 1988. "The Bayesian foundations of solution concepts of games." Journal of Economic Theory 45(2):370--391.Google ScholarCross Ref
Index Terms
- Iterated dominance revisited
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