The handicap principle, strategic information warfare and the paradox of asymmetry

The term asymmetric threat (or warfare) often refers to tactics utilized by countries, terrorist groups, or individuals to carry out attacks on a superior opponent while trying to avoid direct confrontation. Information warfare is sometimes also referred to as a type of asymmetric warfare perhaps due to its asymmetry in terms of cost and efficacy. Obviously, there are differences and commonalities between two types of asymmetric warfare. One major difference lies in the goal to avoid confrontation and one commonality is the asymmetry. Regardless, the unique properties surrounding asymmetric warfare warrant a strategic-level study. Despite enormous studies conducted in the last decade, a consensus on the strategy a nation state should take to deal with asymmetric threat seems still intriguing. In this article, we try to shed some light on the issue from the handicap principle in the context of information warfare. The Handicap principle was first proposed by Zahavi (1975) to explain the honesty or reliability of animal communication signals. He argued that in a signaling system such as one used in mate selection, a superior male is able to signal with a highly developed "handicap" to demonstrate its quality, and the handicap serves "as a kind of (quality) test imposed on the individual" (Zahavi 1975, Searcy and Nowicki 2005). The underlying thread that inspires us for the attempt to establish a connection between the two apparently unrelated areas is the observation that competition, communication and cooperation (3C), which are three fundamental processes in nature and against which natural selection optimize living things, may also make sense in human society. Furthermore, any communication networks, whether it is biological networks (such as animal communication networks) or computer networks (such as the Internet) must be reasonably reliable (honest in the case of animal signaling) to fulfill its missions for transmitting and receiving messages. The strategic goal of information warfare is then to destroy or defend the reliability (honesty) of communication networks. The handicap principle that governs the reliability (honesty) of animal communication networks can be considered as the nature's version of "information warfare" strategy because it is a product of natural selection. What is particularly interesting is to transfer the evolutionary game theory models [e.g., Sir Philip Sydney (SPS) game] for the handicap principle to the study of information warfare. In a broad perspective, we realize that the handicap principle may actually contradict the principle of asymmetry in asymmetric warfare. Anyway, not every species of animals has evolved expensive signaling "equipments" like male peacocks (whose exaggerated train is an example of handicap). Furthermore, the handicap principle is not only about communication, and it also embodies the spirits of cooperation and competition. In human societies, communication modulates cooperation and competition; so does in animal communication networks. Therefore, to evolve or maintain a sustainable communication network, the proper strategy should be to balance (modulate) the cooperation and competition with communication tools (information warfare tools), which is perhaps in contradiction with the asymmetric strategy. There might be a paradox in the strategy of asymmetric warfare, and whether or not information warfare can be used as an asymmetric tool is still an open question.