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Federation of virtualized infrastructures: sharing the value of diversity

Published: 30 November 2010 Publication History

Abstract

By federating virtualized computing and network resources one can significantly increase their value thanks to gains from statistical multiplexing and increases in resource diversity (more distinct locations, technologies, etc.). Successful federation depends upon resource providers being able to agree on policies: how to share the profit generated by external customers and/or how to allocate the resources contributed by the federation participants to their affiliated users. This paper's main contribution is a method that enables organizers of a federation to evaluate the relative importance of the resources contributed by each participant. We build on coalitional game theory concepts and formulate a generic economic model of federation that captures the notion of diversity, which is relevant for a variety of overlay services, and notably the networking research experiments that are running today on PlanetLab. Based on this model, we propose the Shapley value as a means for participants to share the value of federation. We show how this approach can help in the design of policies that encourage infrastructure owners to federate.

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cover image ACM Conferences
Co-NEXT '10: Proceedings of the 6th International COnference
November 2010
349 pages
ISBN:9781450304481
DOI:10.1145/1921168
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than ACM must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]

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Published: 30 November 2010

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Co-NEXT '10
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Co-NEXT '10: Conference on emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies
November 30 - December 3, 2010
Pennsylvania, Philadelphia

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Overall Acceptance Rate 198 of 789 submissions, 25%

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  • (2017)Mathematical Programming Approach for Revenue Maximization in Cloud FederationsIEEE Transactions on Cloud Computing10.1109/TCC.2015.24026745:1(99-111)Online publication date: 1-Jan-2017
  • (2017)Traffic Scheduling and Revenue Distribution Among Providers in the InternetIEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications10.1109/JSAC.2017.265937835:2(421-431)Online publication date: 1-Feb-2017
  • (2015)An agent-oriented, trust-aware approach to improve the QoS in dynamic grid federationsConcurrency and Computation: Practice & Experience10.1002/cpe.360427:17(5411-5435)Online publication date: 10-Dec-2015
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  • (2014)Improving content delivery through coalitions2014 IEEE Network Operations and Management Symposium (NOMS)10.1109/NOMS.2014.6838327(1-9)Online publication date: May-2014
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