Steve Donaldson
ABSTRACT
We describe an implementation of machine self-awareness in which a computer can identify itself among otherwise identical-looking peers based on visual feedback from its own externally observable behavior. Through a combination of both innate and learned mechanisms, the system demonstrates how a machine can successfully participate in a type of poor-man's mirror test. This work forms a foundation from which to address larger issues of machine consciousness and is predicated on the hypothesis that self-awareness is one of the most fundamental aspects of consciousness and also one of the most tractable. Potential limitations and concerns are discussed.
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Index Terms
- Computer, know thyself: exploring consciousness via self-aware machines
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