ABSTRACT
This paper considers the problem of resource monitoring. We consider the scenario where an adversary is physically monitoring on the resource access, such as the electricity line or gas pipeline, of a user in order to learn private information about his victim. Recent works, in the context of smart metering, have shown that a motivated adversary can basically profile a user or a family solely from his electricity traces. However, these works only consider the case of a semi-honest-but-non-intrusive adversary that is only trying to learn information from the consumption reports sent by the user.
This paper, instead, considers the much more challenging case of a intrusive semi-honest adversary, i.e. a semi-honest adversary that is in addition physically monitoring the resource by modifying the distribution network. We aim at answering to the following question: is it possible to design a resource distribution scheme that prevents resource monitoring and provides strong protection? This paper proposes and analyzes several possible solutions. The proposed solutions provide different privacy bounds and performance results.
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Index Terms
- Protecting against physical resource monitoring
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