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The power of procrastination: detection and mitigation of execution-stalling malicious code

Published:17 October 2011Publication History

ABSTRACT

Malware continues to remain one of the most important security problems on the Internet today. Whenever an anti-malware solution becomes popular, malware authors typically react promptly and modify their programs to evade defense mechanisms. For example, recently, malware authors have increasingly started to create malicious code that can evade dynamic analysis.

One recent form of evasion against dynamic analysis systems is stalling code. Stalling code is typically executed before any malicious behavior. The attacker's aim is to delay the execution of the malicious activity long enough so that an automated dynamic analysis system fails to extract the interesting malicious behavior. This paper presents the first approach to detect and mitigate malicious stalling code, and to ensure forward progress within the amount of time allocated for the analysis of a sample. Experimental results show that our system, called HASTEN, works well in practice, and that it is able to detect additional malicious behavior in real-world malware samples.

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      • Published in

        cover image ACM Conferences
        CCS '11: Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
        October 2011
        742 pages
        ISBN:9781450309486
        DOI:10.1145/2046707

        Copyright © 2011 ACM

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        Publication History

        • Published: 17 October 2011

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        CCS '11 Paper Acceptance Rate60of429submissions,14%Overall Acceptance Rate1,261of6,999submissions,18%

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